IN THE 
                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
                      INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

___________________________________
                                   )
THE CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA,  )
THE UTILITIES SERVICE BOARD OF     )
  BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA, and        )
MONROE COUNTY, INDIANA,            )
               Plaintiffs,         )
                                   )
v.                                 )    (No. IP 81-448-C)
                                   )      (Consolidated)
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, )          (with)
               Defendant,          )
                                   )
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,          )       No. IP 83-9-C
               Plaintiff,          )
                                   )
THE STATE OF INDIANA,              )
THE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BOARD )
  OF THE STATE OF INDIANA,         )
       Intervening Plaintiffs,     )
                                   )
v.                                 )
                                   )
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION  )
               Defendant.          )
___________________________________)

          JOINT AMENDED MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

     Comes now Citizens Opposed to PCB Ash, Inc. ("COPA"), a not-
for-profit organization whose mission is to protect the public
health, environment, and property values in the Monroe County,
Indiana area, and joins with the Indiana Public Interest Research
Group ("InPIRG"), a not-for-profit public interest organization
dedicated to consumer and environmental protection in the state of
Indiana, through counsel Rudolph William Savich and Richard E.
Condit, to move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP)
60(b), that this Court vacate its August 22, 1985 judgments in the
above captioned matter (approving a Consent Decree and denying
InPIRG's Motion to Intervene).  Under FRCP 60(b) Movants have an
absolute right to request relief from judgment.  They may file
their request as an independent action, or file a motion. Because
a motion is still pending before this Court pursuant to FRCP 60(b),
Movants are seeking leave of the Court to amend this pleading
consistent with recently discovered information.  Movants are
certain that upon reviewing their submissions to the Court today,
there will be little doubt that justice requires granting leave to
file an amended motion and supporting documentation.  See, FRCP
15(a).
     This motion is based on the grounds that the Court's judgments
regarding intervention and approving the consent decree are void,
contrary to statute, procured by fraud and fraud upon the Court,
inadequately protective of public health and the environment, and
due to changes in material facts, circumstances, and law, no longer
equitable to enforce.  In support of this motion COPA and InPIRG
state:
     1.   This Court, having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1331
and 1332 over the original actions in the above captioned cases,
maintains jurisdiction for purposes of reviewing the resulting
judgments pursuant to a FRCP 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment.
     2.   InPIRG's original Motion for Relief from Judgment was
timely filed in this Court on August 22, 1986.
     3.   InPIRG, in its original motion, moved this Court to
vacate its August 22, 1985 judgments approving a Consent Decree and
denying InPIRG's Motion to Intervene in the above captioned matter.
     4.   In support of its original motion InPIRG relied on the
grounds of newly discovered evidence, misrepresentation, fraud, and
fraud upon the Court.
     5.   InPIRG requested that this Court hold an evidentiary
hearing on the merits of its Motion.
     6.   No evidentiary hearing has been scheduled to date and
InPIRG's Motion is still pending in this court.
     7.   Movants COPA and InPIRG have acquired evidence which
shows that parties to the PCB Consent Decree and their counsel have
misrepresented both critically important material facts and the
central provisions of applicable law to this Court, other parties,
and the public (including the Movants).  
     8.   Movants have also acquired evidence showing that
fundamental changes have occurred in the material facts and law
upon which the Consent Decree was based.  These changes in material
facts and circumstances concern issues of central importance
regarding, inter alia, the fairness, adequacy, reasonableness and
appropriateness of the proposed decree.  
     9.   At the requested evidentiary hearing Movants will prove
that the parties fraudulently misled the Court that all known PCB
contaminated sites were included in the consent decree -- when in
fact the Westinghouse plant property itself and other known PCB
contaminated sites were intentionally excluded from the decree.  
     10.  At the requested evidentiary hearing Movants will prove
that the parties fraudulently misled the Court that newly
discovered sites would be included in the consent decree for
cleanup in a timely manner -- when in fact there are many PCB sites
that were excluded from the agreement and have been either ignored
or acted on outside the agreement with inadequate site assessment
and inadequate public notice and involvement.  
     11.  At the requested evidentiary hearing Movants will prove
that the parties fraudulently misled the Court that the proposed
Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) fueled incinerator was a safe and
proven remedy -- when in fact it is has never been attempted
anywhere before, MSW is the most experimental and least likely to
be effective incineration fuel available, the concept has been
explicitly rejected by EPA for use at a Superfund site in another
region, and risk assessment based on recent EPA data and
calculations demonstrate that exposures, through contamination of
the local food chain, to the deadly chemical dioxin and other
pollutants emitted from the proposed experimental incinerator will
result in hundreds of cancer deaths.  
     12.  At the requested evidentiary hearing Movants will prove
that the parties fraudulently misled the Court that there was
little public opposition to the agreement -- when in fact there was
and is massive, informed, organized opposition to the plan with a
clear majority of the public and local officials opposed to the
proposed MSW fueled incinerator, including a majority of the
business and university community.  
     13.  At the requested evidentiary hearing Movants will prove
that the parties fraudulently misled the Court that the
Westinghouse incinerator plan as provided in the consent decree
would comply with all applicable laws and regulations -- when in
fact EPA and the parties planned to circumvent requirements in
Resource, Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA).  EPA also began an RI/FS as required
by statute and regulation, then for an unknown reason canceled the
study.    
     14.  At the requested evidentiary hearing Movants will prove
that the parties fraudulently misled this Court that the proposed
Consent Decree on its face, and as implemented by the parties,
would require compliance with all applicable law including state
and federal environmental law such as the RCRA, and the TSCA --
when 1) in fact in 1984 Regional EPA officials actually sought in
writing permission from EPA headquarters officials to allow them to
intentionally waive fundamental requirements of both RCRA and
TSCA, and 2) in fact EPA subsequently approved the proposed decree
knowing that the terms of the decree violated those very federal
law requirements, and in fact EPA had written policy documents
which acknowledged that failure to complete the RI/FS studies, for
which it had initiated work plans that it later canceled in
Bloomington, and failure to take public comment on these studies
prior to signing the agency record of decision (called an
enforcement decision document) was a violation of both the
Superfund regulations and the National Environmental Policy Act. 
Movants will prove that despite this agency awareness of the legal
requirements and agency awareness that these requirements were not
being complied with, EPA continued to misrepresent to this Court
that the proposed decree incorporated a remedy chosen in compliance
with all applicable procedural law and that this remedy was in
compliance with all applicable substantive law.  
     15.  Had this Court known of all these and other fraudulent
misrepresentations, concealment by the attorneys and the parties,
the Court would not have found that proposed intervenor InPIRG's
interests were adequately protected by the parties and would have
found the circumstances to warrant approval of InPIRG's motion to
intervene.
     16.  Had it not been for these knowing, fraudulent
misrepresentations made by the parties and their attorneys, this
Court would not have concluded that the proposed consent decree was
fair, adequate, reasonable, and appropriate.
     17.  Subsequent to the filing of InPIRG's original motion,
substantial evidence has come to the attention of COPA and its
counsel which shows that key circumstances and law have changed
dramatically from the time of this Court's entry of the decree.
These fundamental changes make the decree no longer equitable to
enforce.  Among the changes in Superfund in 1986 was the addition
of an explicit statutory requirement for all NPL sites to receive
an RI/FS.  See, 42 U.S.C.  9616(d) (1986).
     18.  The consent of the Monroe County (County) and City of
Bloomington (City) parties to the decree is invalid pursuant to the
Indiana Open Door Law.  The Indiana Open Door Law governs the
decision-making process of such state government parties.  Under
this statute, any decision made by a government body pursuant to a
procedure in violation of the provisions of the Indiana Open Door
Law is void.  InPIRG brought violations by the County and City of
the Open Door Law to the attention of the Indiana courts.  The
Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that InPIRG's Open Door violation
claims could not be heard in the State courts because, as of the
time of the appellate decision, a finding by the state courts that
the County and City had violated the Open Door Law in deciding to
approve the proposed federal PCB Consent Decree would void that
decree which had subsequently been entered by the federal court,
and thus InPIRG's suit was a collateral attack on the federal
judgment and should be brought instead directly before the federal
court.  InPIRG, pursuant to the instant motion, now brings these
violations to the attention of this Court.  Furthermore, Monroe
County's approval of the consent decree was expressly conditioned
upon the truth of the assurances it received that the consent
decree was in complete compliance with all federal, state, and
local laws.  See, Resolution 85-16 (exhibit 23).  The failure of
the EPA to conduct a RI/FS constitutes such a violation of federal
law so as to vitiate the County's consent.
     19.  The consent of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) is invalid as a result of violations of federal laws
which govern the decision process of the EPA in selecting a remedy
for Superfund National Priorities List (NPL) hazardous waste sites.
     20.  COPA and InPIRG have standing to file this Motion because
they have members directly affected by the economic, health and
environmental impacts of the decree, and as parties having
knowledge of fraud upon the court and violations of law perpetrated
by the parties to the decree.
     21.  Pursuant to FRCP 7(b)(1) and 9(b), which require
particularity in the statement of grounds for motions and in the
pleading of fraud on the court, Movants make the following further
statements in support of the instant motion.
     22.  The fraud on the court and the public involves a pattern
of improper actions by the parties' attorneys and the parties which
has spanned a sixteen year period.  In order for this Court to
fully understand the depth of this fraud, an evidentiary hearing is
required.  The essential elements of this fraud on the court and on
the public is described below, in chronological form.
     23.  In 1975 a major hazardous waste contamination problem was
publicly disclosed in Bloomington, Indiana, to wit: the fact that
Westinghouse had disposed of PCBs in the Bloomington sewer system
and area landfills.
     24.  In 1976 the Indiana Environmental Management Board
conducted hearings on the scope of and responsibility for the
pollution, with both the City of Bloomington and Westinghouse named
as defendants.  
     25.  In 1977 prior to completion of the hearings, the State
granted a request by these two defendants, the City of Bloomington
(City) and Westinghouse, the company responsible for the
contamination, to indefinitely postpone further hearings in order
to allow the City and Westinghouse to privately negotiate.
     26.  From 1977-1981 the City and Westinghouse, defendants in
the state hearings and both potentially responsible parties having
strict liability for cleanup of sites where their waste was
disposed or which they owned and operated, negotiated regarding
cleanup of the Winston-Thomas sewage plant, a City owned property,
with the ongoing hazard at this and other sites going unremediated
during these years.
     27.  Prior to and during 1981, EPA conducted investigations
and assessments of the Westinghouse plant property itself which
confirmed PCB and hazardous waste contamination on that site.  EPA
detected 1,100 parts per million (ppm) of PCBs in sediment from a
water runoff ditch and found high levels of contamination in runoff
water at the Westinghouse site.  The Neal's Landfill and Neal's
Dump site were also being investigated during this time period.  
     28.  In 1980, the Superfund statute was passed by the U.S.
Congress creating strict liability for clean up costs for NPL sites
such as Lemon Lane, Neal's Landfill and Dump, and Bennett's Quarry. 
     29.  In 1981 the City filed (in this Court) a common law
nuisance, negligence and trespass action against Westinghouse
concerning the City owned sewage plant, and later in 1981 amended
this complaint to include the Lemon Lane Landfill, also City owned
and operated, contamination of which was publicly disclosed in
1981.
     30.  In January 1983, approximately two years later, while the
City and Westinghouse continued litigation without resolution, the
EPA filed a complaint in this Court against Westinghouse under the
RCRA and sections 104, 106, and 107 of Superfund to compel
Westinghouse to cleanup two sites, Neal's landfill and Neal's Dump,
and to obtain reimbursement from Westinghouse of approximately $2
million in EPA monies already spent on limited protective measures
on these two sites.  Conspicuously absent from this EPA complaint
was any reference to the Westinghouse plant property which was
known to be contaminated.  Also absent from the EPA complaint was
the Bennett's Quarry site which was reported to the Monroe County
Health Department in March of 1983.  In 1983, EPA staff visited the
Bennett's site and wrote a preliminary report disclosing major site
contamination problems.
     31.  In July 1983 following EPA's suit in January of 1983, EPA
prepared limited assessments of remedial alternatives for the
Neal's Dump and Neal's Landfill sites, both sites eventually
qualified for placement on the Superfund NPL.  EPA's assessments
did not address the garbage fueled PCB soil incineration remedy
ultimately "chosen" (which was unknown to and unanticipated by EPA
at that time), but evaluated the feasibility and cost of either
capping contaminated soils or removing the soil to an out-of-state
landfill and the capacitors to a conventional incinerator out-of-state.
     32.  These 1983 EPA studies did not address the critical
components of the remedy actually selected later (as a result of
the Westinghouse/City negotiation proposal to EPA) including the
concept of incineration of 700,000 tons of PCB contaminated soils, 
and the experimental idea of using municipal garbage as a fuel for
incineration of hazardous waste.  Nor did EPA address the central
question of environmental, public health and economic impacts of
the proposed incineration technology on the Bloomington area.
     33.  In 1983, EPA signed Enforcement Decision Documents (EDDs
or Enforcement Records of Decision) selecting the remedy to be
sought in litigation on the Neal's Landfill and Neal's Dump sites
(capping the hazardous waste in place and shipment of certain
hazardous waste out of state, not the MSW incineration plan later
proposed by Westinghouse).  EPA did not release these decision
documents to the public nor seek comment on them, just as there had
been no public comment allowed on the remedial alternative studies
of the two Neal's sites.  Apparently, these EPA decision documents
on the Neal's sites were also withheld from this Court, as well as
from the public, along with the secret EDD selecting the
Westinghouse incineration plan, during the time when the Court and
the public were reviewing the proposed consent decree.
     34.  In 1983, the remedy initially selected by EPA did not
involve incineration in Monroe County nor garbage as fuel for
incineration.  The initial EPA remedy did require leaving some PCB
waste in the ground in Monroe County (with a cap) and required the
remaining waste be transported out of state and disposed of in some
other community.  Both of these options were later described by the
City and other parties, during efforts to persuade the public to
support the Westinghouse proposal for MSW fueled incineration in
Monroe County, as unacceptable as a matter of policy.  No
explanation was presented to the public during the comment period
on the proposed decree as to why EPA had initially selected these
options if they were as unacceptable as the City and other parties
later claimed.
     35.  EPA documents dated 1982-1985 completely contradict EPA's
current position that a Remedial Investigation/ Feasibility Study
(RI/FS) was not required of, and therefore not done by, EPA at
Superfund sites during the 1982-1985 period during which the
Bloomington Superfund cleanup settlement was negotiated.  These EPA
documents demonstrate that EPA in fact referred to the study EPA
performed on Neal's Landfill as an "RI/FS", that EPA planned
"RI/FS"s for the other Bloomington NPL sites but later canceled
these plans, and that EPA has routinely conducted an RI/FS at every
other Superfund remedial site in the country, from 1981 - present. 

     36.  Documents dated in 1983, acquired by Movants, show that
EPA had actually developed a work plan for conducting an RI/FS for
the Lemon Lane site (also an NPL site) and an RI/FS for the
Bennett's Quarry site (an NPL site).
     37.  In September 1983 the EPA had gone as far as seeking and
obtaining from the state of Indiana review and comments on the EPA
work plan for the Lemon Lane RI/FS.  Mysteriously, these Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Studies on the Lemon Lane Landfill site
and on the Bennett's Quarries site were never completed.  The
existence of the work plan was never revealed to the public and
presumably not to this Court.  Despite numerous FOIA requests
submitted to EPA by Movants, which should have released the work
plan into the public domain, it has yet to be produced.
     38.  In October of 1983, less than three months after EPA had
selected the remedy for the two Neal's sites (and less than one
month after EPA had received State comments on the RI/FS work plans
for the Bennett's and Lemon Lane sites) the City and Westinghouse
announced a proposed settlement of their litigation on the two City
properties, the Lemon Lane Landfill and the Winston-Thomas sewage
treatment plant.  This proximity in timing is unlikely to be
coincidence and suggests the strong possibility that the City and
Westinghouse influenced the EPA to abandon the plan to complete an
RI/FS.  The City and the State of Indiana both had liability
concerns regarding the Lemon Lane Landfill as an NPL site and any
contamination resulting therefrom.  Under the federal Superfund
statute and regulations, as EPA acknowledges, states must pay at
least 50% of EPA cleanup expenditures at NPL sites that were
municipally owned and operated.  Of course, such liability would
not be found where another party can be shown to be responsible for
the contamination.
     39.  Thus in 1983, as a result of the passage of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA or Superfund) in 1980, the City and State had an interest
in minimizing the extent of contamination viewed by EPA as Lemon
Lane related and had a similar interest in avoiding entirely an EPA
directed and funded cleanup of Lemon Lane.  These City and State
interests in avoiding liability under Superfund were not, and are
not, synonymous with the interest of the public and Movants in
expediting full assessment of Lemon Lane and related contamination
and cleanup by whoever and whatever means most protects the public
health and environment.
     40.  In 1983 and 1984, as a consequence of these special
interests of the City and State in minimizing their strict
liability under Superfund and perhaps in covering up delay and
errors by City and State officials in their handling of waste sites
and waste site information in the past, several major decisions
were made by the City, State, and Westinghouse that did not reflect
the interests of the public at large, and of Movants specifically.
     41.  First, in 1983, the State of Indiana requested that EPA
should restrict the scope of the planned RI/FS on Lemon Lane
Landfill to exclude study of known and suspected contaminated areas
around Lemon Lane Landfill.  Such areas as the nearby wooded
depression and other local areas were known by EPA to be
contaminated with PCBs originating from Lemon Lane Landfill.
     42.  Second, in October 1983, the City of Bloomington and
Westinghouse privately agreed on a garbage fueled incineration plan
that required taxpayers to pay Westinghouse to burn local garbage
in the proposed incinerator, and requested EPA to join in
negotiating this proposal as a settlement of the EPA litigation on
the two Neal's sites and the recently discovered Bennett's site.
     43.  The parties have represented to the public, local
officials and this Court that the MSW fueled incineration plan was
selected on the basis of criteria specified in the environmental
statutes and regulations, that the MSW fueled incineration plan was
selected because it was a proven technology, and that the MSW
fueled incineration plan was selected because it would be more
protective of public health and environment than other
alternatives.  It is now clear, based on a confidential memo sent
from City attorney Joseph Karaganis to County officials, that the
only reason MSW fueled incineration was selected was as a financial
incentive to Westinghouse.   
     44.  The October 1983 agreement between the City and
Westinghouse, which has been incorporated into the current consent
decree, involves payment by the City and County of a per ton
tipping fee to Westinghouse for every ton of garbage burned (as
fuel) in the proposed PCB incinerator.  The exact amounts to be
paid can not be calculated with precision at this time. However, it
is clear that under this arrangement that taxpayers would end up
shouldering most if not all of Westinghouse's cleanup costs.  The
tipping fee is tied to the fee at the Monroe County Landfill. 
Estimates by Westinghouse and County officials of the amount of
this fee at the time the incinerator would go on line have ranged
from $15/ton to $50/ton.  The incinerator is proposed to burn at
least 150 tons of garbage per day, and would operate from 300-350
days per year, for 15 years (possibly longer).
     45.  The 1983 MSW tipping fee agreement between the City and
Westinghouse would result in tipping fees to Westinghouse in the
tens of millions of dollars, which is exactly the range
Westinghouse anticipates the cleanup costs to fall into. 
Westinghouse publicly disputed the cleanup cost estimates by the
State of Indiana of $50 million dollars as being excessively high. 
     Further, Westinghouse plans to generate steam and electricity
from the incinerator which it will sell for additional millions of
dollars.  Westinghouse has also used EPA, state and court approval
of its incineration plan as a de facto endorsement to launch itself
into the garbage and hazardous waste disposal business nationally,
generating additional millions.  Thus, there is some real basis for
Westinghouse's statement to the media that it does not expect this
cleanup decree to affect its earnings negatively.  It is the City
and County taxpayers who must bear the cost of Westinghouse's
reckless disposal of toxic and hazardous wastes.
     46.  Although later, in December 1984 and 1985 the terms of
the proposed decree were made public, this Westinghouse financial
incentive basis for the 1983 remedy selection by the City and
Westinghouse, which was later incorporated into the December 4,
1984 remedy selection by EPA, was never disclosed to the public as
such nor, to Movants' knowledge, to this Court.  The "confidential"
memo from City attorney Karaganis to County officials which makes
this financial incentive rationale clear was discovered only after
the public comment period had expired and this Court had entered
the decree.  Financial incentive for the polluting industry is not
a valid criteria for remedy selection under Superfund, and even if
it were, it was not disclosed as a basis for the decision during
the public review and comment period.
     47.  In 1983 and 1984, the only conceivable basis for the City
and State accepting such an experimental plan (garbage has never
been used before as fuel for hazardous waste incineration and is
known to have highly variable heat value) and such a costly plan
(the tipping fees agreed to be paid to Westinghouse would be at
least twice as high, and likely several times as high, as the
current landfill rates for garbage disposal) -- and the only
conceivable reason for the City and State accepting the idea of a
polluter being paid by taxpayers to cleanup contamination resulting
from the polluter's own reckless acts, a concept offensive on its
face to public policy -- is the City's and State's concern with
their strict liability under Superfund for Lemon Lane and related
contamination.  This contamination would have cost millions of
dollars to cleanup.
     48.  While normally a private party to litigation such as a
corporation would be allowed to trade off liability concerns for
payments and technology changes without the resulting agreement
being considered unfair, inadequate, unreasonable or inappropriate,
the situation is different for government parties involved in
environmental contamination litigation.  The government parties
have interests to protect on behalf of the public including public
health and environmental quality which go well beyond
considerations of financial liability, or face-saving for
individual officials.
     49.  The third 1983-1984 action by the City and Westinghouse
which was not in the public interest was that, as the secret
negotiations ensued totally out of the public view and out of the
view of this Court, EPA was apparently persuaded to drop entirely
its planned Remedial Investigations/Feasibility Studies for both
the Lemon Lane and Bennett's sites.  EPA seemed to ignore its
statutory obligation under the National Environmental Policy Act
and regulatory obligation under the Superfund National Contingency
Plan (NCP) to conduct either an RI/FS or a more comprehensive
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
     50.  EPA has a history, from 1982 through 1985, and to this
day, of consistently performing an RI/FS at every NPL site in the
nation (except in Bloomington) and has consistently from 1982
through 1985, and to the present, acknowledged explicitly its legal
obligation under NEPA and the NCP to do so, by way of an endless
list of official EPA policy documents, memoranda, and federal
register notices, and in promulgating the NCP regulations
themselves, both in 1982 and in 1985.  This mass of indisputable
evidence directly contradicts representations made by EPA to this
Court, the public and local officials.   The position EPA currently
expresses to the public, local government, Congress and the federal
courts to the effect that EPA had no such statutory and regulatory
obligations to conduct an RI/FS or EIS is misrepresentation and
post hoc rationalization, pure and simple.  Movants will present
indisputable evidence of this to the Court at the requested
evidentiary hearing.  
     51.  It must be emphasized that from 1984-1991, throughout
over six years of continual public and administrative petitions and
challenges by Movants and other concerned citizens alleging that
EPA had such obligations to conduct an RI/FS or EIS for the
Bloomington NPL sites, EPA has maintained its posture with the
public and officials alike that these studies were not required by
law and that this is why the studies were not performed by EPA for
the Bloomington sites.  EPA maintained this false posture never
once disclosing that it had acknowledged its obligation to do these
studies in innumerable official documents, never once disclosing
that it had actually performed, in its view, an RI/FS on Neal's
Landfill, and never once disclosing that it had even initiated work
plans to perform an RI/FS on both the Lemon Lane and Bennett's
sites, only to decide not to go through the studies.
     52.  The fourth action, or failure to act during the 1981-1987
period, by the parties pursuant to the decree that was clearly
counter to the public interest and the interest of Movants was the
failure of the City to take protective measures at the Lemon Lane
Landfill to prevent excessive exposure to cancer causing chemicals
emitted into the air and water from the site.  The EPA and the
State of Indiana had separately submitted written directions to the
City in 1981 to take such protective measures at the site,
including the placement of a protective cap on the site which would
have prevented excessive air emissions of PCBs and other dangerous
chemicals, as well as reducing water contamination.
     53.  Unfortunately, the City refused to pay for placement of
such a cap and the State and EPA both failed to either take the
protective measure of capping the site themselves or to take
enforcement action against the City or Westinghouse to require them
to do so.  However, in 1983 EPA took samples of air over the Lemon
Lane site and analyzed the PCB emissions into the air from the
site.  EPA found that levels of PCBs were being emitted into the
air from the site and found that in comparison, that a similarly
contaminated site in another state that had been capped had
virtually no air emissions after the capping.  The risk of cancer
estimate for the air emissions from the Lemon Lane site was 1,000
per 1,000,000 population. 
     54.  Unfortunately, the EPA did not inform the residents
living around this site of the high PCB levels being emitted into
the air and the risk posed by such PCB emissions to the nearby
residents.  According to an internal State memo state employees
were instructed to wear respiratory protection equipment at the
site.  And, according to the memo, were further instructed by EPA
not to reveal the extent of the air contamination risk to the
public.  The EPA, for reasons which are unclear, took no action to
cap the site despite the incontrovertible evidence which it had
just developed showing the urgent need to do so.
     55.  EPA failed to take any action to cap the site or to warn
the residents not only during the three years prior to EPA's PCB
air tests in 1983, but also failed to take such protective measures
for four additional years thereafter.  It was only in 1987 that EPA
finally announced to the public that capping the site was "urgent"
because the PCB air emissions from Lemon Lane posed a tremendously
high cancer risk to the residents of one thousand additional cancer
cases per million, one thousand times higher risk than EPA
routinely considers as unacceptable.  This belated 1987 EPA action,
based on calculations of risk using the 1983 data, was apparently
prompted not by concern for residents' health but by a desire to
persuade the City and local citizens to cease their insistence that
Westinghouse test the Lemon Lane site for the deadly chemical
dioxin prior to moving contaminated surface material from the site
into the city for "temporary" storage.  
     56.  The fifth action taken in 1983-1984 which was clearly
counter to the interests of the public and Movants, and the last
one to be detailed here, was that EPA and the State omitted the
Westinghouse facility itself, and apparently other sites, from the
cleanup plan.  The State had previously not only acknowledged the
facility as contaminated but had stated that the omission of the
facility from the cleanup plan would be a major fault in the
proposal.  The County also requested that the Westinghouse site be
included in the plan.  Other sites have been reported and confirmed
as contaminated with PCBs both before and after the decree was
entered by this Court.  Some have been ignored by the parties, and
some have been addressed by EPA outside of the decree process over
the objection of citizens.  None have been included in the decree
process, in direct contradiction to representations made by
attorneys for the parties in direct response to questions from this
Court at a status conference prior to this Court deciding to enter
the decree.  
     57.  Had the true basis for the selection of MSW fueled
incineration and for the exclusion of other contaminated sites from
the proposed plan been revealed to this Court, the Court's
judgments approving the proposed decree and denying InPIRG
intervention would have been different.  Had the Court been
informed that EPA had originally selected a different, less
experimental remedy, and that state and county officials had
originally sought to include the contaminated Westinghouse plant
property in the proposed cleanup plan, the Court's judgment's would
have been different.
     58.  The City and Westinghouse motivated by their financial
liability under Superfund, may well have undertaken to convince EPA
to secretly cancel EPA's planned Remedial Investigations/
Feasibility Studies and circumvent public review and comment on the
RI/FSs.  Equally disturbing and unprecedented nationally, EPA
decided to keep secret EPA's Record of Decision (EDD) itself during
the entire period for public and court review of the proposed
decree.  These improper agency actions have accomplished, at least
thus far, the illegal purpose of avoiding a comparison of the
feasibility and impacts of the proposed experimental MSW fueled PCB
soil/sludge incinerator with the feasibility and environmental
impacts of alternatives.  The parties undoubtedly anticipated that
if they followed the RI/FS and public comment procedure required by
law that their experimental proposal would receive a level of
scientific and legal scrutiny from the Bloomington/Indiana
University community that the proposal could not survive. Had the
Court known of this misconduct and circumvention of the procedures
required by law which resulted in an incomplete and misleading
record being presented for this Court's review, this Court's
judgment's would have been different. 
     59.  In December of 1984, after nine years of delay, a
proposed settlement among EPA, Westinghouse, the City, and the
State of Indiana was announced.  The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) officially selected the remedy for the four National
Priorities List (NPL) sites in the Bloomington, Indiana area (and
for two non-NPL sites as well) when EPA signed the Enforcement
Decision Document (EDD) on December 4, 1984.  No written analysis
of alternatives had been conducted for two of the four NPL sites
(Lemon Lane Landfill and Bennett's Quarry sites) and for the two
non-NPL sites (Winston-Thomas sewage plant and Anderson Road
Landfill sites).  The two sites that were allegedly studied (Neal's
Dump and Landfill) no analysis of the Westinghouse incineration
plan, or any incineration plan, was considered.  To date, no such
analyses have been conducted for these four sites.  Similarly, no
written analysis of environmental impacts of the selected remedy
and of alternative remedies has ever been produced by EPA. 
Consequently, EPA's decision to choose the clean up remedy provided
for in the consent decree, was clearly arbitrary and capricious.  
     60.  The first public meeting to take comment on the proposed
consent decree which emerged from the secret negotiations was held
December 5, 1984, one day after  EPA signed the ROD/EDD.  Public
comment came after the remedy selection was completed.  Neither a
remedial investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) nor an
environmental impact statement (EIS), nor any type of written
analysis of alternatives and environmental impacts was provided for
public comment.  The EPA record of decision (ROD/EDD) documents
themselves were kept secret during the entire public comment period
and during this Court's review of the proposed decree, and for over
two years after EPA signed the ROD/EDD.  The ROD/EDD was not filed
with the court nor provided to local officials prior to or during
their decisions.  The ROD/EDD might never have been disclosed by
EPA were it not for InPIRG's investigation and FOIA requests. 
     61.  The vast majority of citizens, environmentalists and
public interest groups in the area opposed the proposed decree and
oppose to this day implementation of the current decree cleanup
plan. Public opposition is based on the fact that the agreement was
negotiated in secret by City and County officials, Westinghouse,
EPA and State officials in violation of the Indiana Open Door Law; 
the cleanup agreement excluded many of the known areas of
contamination which appeared to serve only the interests of
Westinghouse and the City in minimizing their liability for cleanup
costs; the technological remedy proposed was experimental; and the
proposed remedy had been selected without the public receiving the
benefit of reviewing the environmental studies required by law. 
     62.  The idea of garbage as fuel was opposed by citizens and
environmentalists because it would make the already difficult task
of incinerating PCBs in soil virtually impossible to perform
without creating unacceptable risks from toxic by-products of
incineration due to the wide variability in heat value of municipal
waste and due to the additional toxic heavy metals and dioxin/furan
precursors which garbage would introduce into the incinerator.  The
use of municipal waste as fuel, an idea which had never before been
tried and had been rejected by EPA for a similar Superfund cleanup
in Texas, served no purpose other than to allow Westinghouse to
recoup its cleanup costs via tipping fees which the City and County
had privately agreed to pay Westinghouse.
     63.  The public was opposed to the proposed decree because the
EPA, rather than performing a feasibility study to examine
alternatives and environmental impacts prior to selecting a remedy,
essentially approved the remedy already negotiated by Westinghouse
and the City (both responsible parties under Superfund).  The
public is even more opposed now than in 1984 because, inter alia,
EPA failed to release the ROD until 1987, and then only after
persistent and multiple Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests
and other prompting from InPIRG Chairman Mick Harrison.  Further,
public comment was not taken on either a study of alternatives and
impacts or on the Record of Decision prior to the remedy being
selected.  The EPA had signed the ROD as a final agency action one
day before the first public meeting.  The discovery of this fact in
1987 has obviously only strengthened public opposition.  Even
today, the full record of EPA's decision process has not been
released to the public, despite yet another FOIA request, this one
by COPA.
     64.  InPIRG's original Motion for Relief from Judgment was
timely filed in this Court on August 22, 1986.  InPIRG, in its
original motion moved this Court to vacate its August 25, 1985
judgments approving a Consent Decree and denying InPIRG's Motion to
Intervene in the above captioned matter.  In support of its motion
InPIRG relied on the grounds of newly discovered evidence,
misrepresentation, fraud, and other just cause including fraud upon
the Court.  InPIRG's Motion, supporting Memorandum, and Memorandum
in Reply are hereby incorporated by reference. 
     65.  InPIRG requested that this Court hold an evidentiary
hearing on the merits of its Motion.  No evidentiary hearing has
been scheduled to date and InPIRG's Motion is still pending in this
court.  After thorough investigation of both the facts and law, and
as a result of the discovery of additional material
misrepresentations and non-disclosures by EPA and other parties to
the Consent Decree and their attorneys, and out of concern for
preventing and remedying violations of state and federal laws and
protecting the health and environment of the residents of
Bloomington and Monroe County from the imminent threat of serious
harm, Movants COPA and InPIRG bring the instant Motion for Relief
from Judgment, and request an evidentiary hearing.  
     WHEREFORE, COPA and InPIRG, by counsel Rudolph William Savich
and Richard E. Condit, request that: 
     1.   the Orders of this Court of August 22, 1985 be vacated or
in the alternative that an evidentiary hearing be held to consider
the merits of this Motion, and upon proper showing, that these same
Orders be vacated;
     2.   COPA and InPIRG be granted intervention status;
     3.   EPA be instructed to commence an RI/FS for each NPL site
consistent with the current NCP;
     4.   COPA and InPIRG receive Technical Assistance Grants
within 60 days of this order for work on each of the Westinghouse
NPL sites;
     5.   all attorneys' fees and costs of Movants will be paid by
the parties;
     6.   all other relief deemed appropriate will be provided by
this Court.    
                              Respectfully submitted,


                              Rudolph William Savich
                              505 North Walnut Street
                              Bloomington, IN.  47404
                              (812) 336-7293                                                        
                              Of Counsel:
                              Richard E. Condit
                              Government Accountability Project
                              25 E Street, NW, Suite 700
                              Washington, DC  20001
                              (202) 347-0460
                              Attorneys for COPA and InPIRG